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The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) regulates the natural gas industry.
From the wellhead to the city gate,2 the NGA regulates the sale for resale,
and the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.3 By enacting
the NGA, Congress intended to regulate the natural gas industry specifically
to protect consumers from anticompetitive practices of natural gas pipelines
and to ensure consumers reliable and secure supplies of natural gas at the
lowest reasonable price.4 Accordingly, the NGA's "prime constituency" is
the consumer.5
Since the early 1980's, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Com-
mission), the federal agency responsible for implementing the NGA, has
eliminated or revised regulations it had previously imposed on the industry.6
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1988).
2. The wellhead is the point of the natural gas production. The city gate is the point
where the interstate pipeline completes its interstate transportation and where the local distri-
bution company begins its intrastate natural gas service.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) states:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for
ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use,
and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not
apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of
natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or
gathering of natural gas.
Id.
4. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944) ("The primary aim of this
legislation was to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas compa-
nies."). Congress' intent was that "'natural gas should be sold in interstate commerce for
resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use
at the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in
the public interest'" and to afford consumers a "complete, permanent and effective bond of
protection from excessive rates and charges." Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360
U,S. 378, 388 (1959) (quoting original text of NGA, 52 Stat. 825 (1938)).
5. Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Order No. 380, Elimination of Variable Costs From Pipeline Minimum
Commodity Bill Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 154 (1990)),
reh'g, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,259 (1984), aff'd, Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 114 (1986); Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipe-
lines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2,
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The deregulatory initiatives developed partly in response to evolving market
structures, and partly in response to changing Commission policy which in-
creasingly allows market competition, rather than government regulation, to
"regulate" the industry.7 As a result of industry deregulation, the Commis-
sion more readily allows industrial consumers to "bypass" their traditional
local distribution companies (LDC) and to purchase natural gas directly
from the LDC's pipeline supplier. LDC bypass means fewer customers
share the costs associated with maintaining the LDC's facilities. Conse-
quently, the costs that the remaining customers pay increases.' In the past,
the Commission was concerned about the increased costs to residential con-
sumers caused by LDC bypass, and refused to permit the bypass. In the new
deregulated market, however, the Commission is less concerned about in-
creased costs associated with LDC bypass and is more interested in enhanc-
ing competition in the marketplace as the method to control consumers'
costs.9
Yet, in light of the NGA's congressional directive to protect consumers,' 0
the question arises whether the Commission's change in policy and more
readily allowing LDC bypass complies with its statutory mandate." As
157, 250, 284, 375, 381) [hereinafter Order No. 436], reh'g 51 Fed. Reg. 438 (1986), rev'd,
Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006
(1988); Order No. 451, Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 154, 157, 270, 271, 284), vacated, Mobil Oil v. FERC, 885 F.2d 209
(5th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 615 (1991); Order No. 490, Abandonment of Sales and
Purchases of Natural Gas Under Expired, Terminated, or Modified Contracts, 53 Fed. Reg.
4,121 (1988) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 157); Order No. 500, Interim Rule and Statement of
Policy, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284), aff'd, American Gas
Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
7. See, e.g., Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,413 (indicating that the Commission is
changing its traditional public utility form of regulation to allow competitive forces to play a
role in regulating); see also Fox, Transforming an Industry by Agency Rulemaking: Regulation
of Natural Gas by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 23 LAND & WATER L.R. 113,
118 (1988) (indicating that the Commission had changed in the early 1980's from Carter-
appointed Commissioners to Reagan-appointed Commissioners, and that the Reagan appoin-
tees shared and implemented President Reagan's views of less governmental regulation of
business).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
9. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,413.
10. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
11. A similar question has been raised in efforts to deregulate other regulated industries as
well. See Broadman & Kalt, How Natural is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass in Natural Gas
Distribution Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1989) (citing entry deregulation as an issue in
the reform of the telecommunications, postal, cable, and electric industries). For example, in
Public Utility Commission of Texas v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989), an industrial
customer bypassed its local telephone exchange by transmitting its telephone signals via its
own microwave facilities. The Public Utility Commission of Texas attempted to require the
industrial user to return to the local exchange, arguing that if the industrial customer could
1158 [Vol. 39:1157
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consumers increase natural gas use because it is a cost-efficient and environ-
mentally safe fuel, the Commission's new policy regarding LDC bypass and
its reliance on competitive pressures will become more significant to natural
gas consumers. 2
This Comment addresses whether the Commission's new LDC bypass
policy is consistent with the congressional mandate of the NGA. It begins
with an analysis of the structure of the natural gas industry, emphasizing the
role of the LDC. Next, it addresses the purposes behind the passage of the
NGA and Congress' accompanying concerns. This Comment then reviews
the Commission's historic preference against LDC bypass, and recent
changes in the natural gas market which set the stage for the Commission's
change in its LDC bypass policy. This Comment then examines the
rulemaking order which provides the basis for the Commission's change in
policy, and analyzes several recent bypass cases. This Comment concludes
that, while certain participants in the natural gas industry, such as industrial
customers and interstate pipelines, can take advantage of the newly deregu-
lated market, other segments of the industry, such as residential consumers,
cannot. Therefore, because residential consumers cannot realistically com-
pete in the new deregulated market, they continue to require regulatory pro-
tection. If the Commission is unwilling to protect the residential consumers,
then the states should be permitted to take a more active role in ensuring
consideration of consumer interests.
I. THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
A. The Industry in a Nutshell
Natural gas serves as a significant energy source in America today.
Although it was once burned off as an unwanted by-product of petroleum
production, I" natural gas now fulfills almost a quarter of the nation's energy
needs.14 Natural gas is often referred to as a clean-burning fuel 5 because,
determine the method of its local exchange service, the customer, rather than the PUC, was
then setting policy on telephone access and "risking stranded investment and perhaps an in-
crease of telephone rates for those who do not have the flexibility, by virtue of a private micro-
wave network, to chose their points of access to the public switchboard network." Id. at 1330.
Still, the FCC permitted the bypass.
12. The United States Department of Energy issed a National Energy Strategy to lay a
"foundation for a more efficient, less vulnerable and evironmentally sustainable energy future."
National Energy Strategy, Executive Summary at 2. One of the strategy's goals is to increase
consumption of natural gas in the United States by the year 2000.
13. Connole, General Considerations: A Nation's Natural-Gas Pains, 44 GEO. L.J. 555,
556 (1956).
14. 1989 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, DOE/
EIA-0384(89) at 11 (1989).
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unlike oil and coal, it does not emit large amounts of carbon dioxide when
burned. In an environmentally conscious America, natural gas is quickly
becoming the fuel of choice.
16
Historically, the natural gas industry has been comprised of several seg-
ments which, working together, have produced, transported, and distributed
natural gas to consumers.17 Each segment of the industry plays a significant
but distinct role, and each operates in a different regulatory environment."
Because of the series of actors involved in the natural gas market from the
point of production to the point of consumption, natural gas is bought and
sold several times from production to ultimate consumption.19
Traditionally, the first actors in the movement of natural gas to consumers
are the producers. Producers explore, drill, produce, and sell natural gas to
interstate pipelines. While producers were initially free from federal regula-
tion, the Supreme Court in 1954 held certain natural gas producers subject
to federal price controls.2' Subsequently, however, Congress enacted the
Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, which effectively reversed the
1954 Court opinion.21
The next segment of the natural gas industry is the interstate pipelines,
which are regulated by the Commission.22 The interstate pipelines purchase
gas from producers at the wellhead,23 or from other pipelines. The purchas-
ing pipeline transports the gas to the LDCs, or to large industrial custom-
ers.24 Because interstate pipelines function both as purchaser of natural gas
for resale and as transporter of gas to customers, the pipeline traditionally
15. R. PIERCE, JR., G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC REGULATION: ENERGY,
TRANSPORTATION AND UTILmES 456-57 (1980) [hereinafter R. PIERCE, JR.]. Natural gas is
sold by volume, typically by million cubic feet (Mcf). It takes approximately one (1) Mcf of
gas per day to fuel a residential customer's household during cold weather. Id.
16. See 1989 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW,
DOE/EIA-0384(89) at 11 (1989) (indicating increases in natural gas consumption since 1986).
17. See Fox, supra note 7, at 114; see also R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 15, at 455.
18. See AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS RATE FUNDAMENTALS 91-92 (4th ed. 1987).
19. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas
Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1983).
20. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). In this controversial opin-
ion, the Court held that the Commission has jurisdiction over the wellhead price of natural
gas. Such pricing was previously thought to be a state issue, and outside of the Commission's
jurisdiction. After the decision, the Commission embarked on an ambitious program to set
wellhead prices. See Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burner-
tip, 9 ENERGY LJ. 1, 8-10 (1988).
21. See Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989) (repealing Title I of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-33 (1988)), effective in 1993).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988); supra note 3.
23. See supra note 2.
24. W. Fox, FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY § 1502, at 425 (1983).
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has acted more as a gas merchant. Recently, however, interstate pipelines
have offered their transportation and sales services separately, and today
many act more as transporters than as merchants.
In the final segment of the market, LDCs purchase the gas directly from
interstate pipelines, and then resell and distribute the gas to customers
within their service territory.25 Because of the intrastate nature of local dis-
tribution, LDCs largely remain free from federal jurisdiction2 6 and are regu-
lated by their state utility commissions." In a number of opinions, the
Supreme Court has determined that local distribution commences when the
gas leaves the high pressured interstate pipelines and enters the lower pres-
sured LDC pipeline facilities.
28
The structure of the local gas market is a significant factor in analyzing
the issue of LDC bypass. LDCs traditionally purchased their gas from the
interstate pipelines and then resold and distributed it to residential and in-
dustrial consumers on their local pipeline distribution system. A typical
LDC consists of in-state transportation pipelines and other plant facilities
used in distributing and selling gas to its customers. The utility incurs costs
in operating and maintaining its facilities, as well as in running the busi-
ness.29 These costs are passed on to the LDC's customers through the util-
ity's rates.
In the local market, LDCs serve two main categories of customers: Indus-
trial customers, such as businesses and factories, and residential consum-
ers.30 These two groups make different demands on the LDC for service, but
both benefit from a varied customer mix. 3  For example, because many in-
25. Pierce, supra note 19, at 348.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)-(c) (1988). In FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950),
the Court interpreted the NGA to allow the Commission to regulate LDCs. In 1954, Congress
amended the NGA to add section 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c), and reversed the Court's decision.
The Commission can, however, exert limited jurisdiction over an LDC if the LDC engages in
interstate activities. See, e.g., Texas E. Transmission Corp., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,248 at 61,873-74
(1989).
27. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 4-101 (1988); MICH. COMp. LAWS.
§ 460.6 (1990).
28. See., e.g., East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. at 469-70 ("[W]hat Congress must have meant
by 'facilities' for 'local distribution' was equipment for distributing gas among consumers
within a particular local community, not the high-pressure pipe lines transporting the gas to
the local mains."); see also Lindh, Federal Preemption of State Regulation in the Field of Elec-
tricity and Natural Gas: A Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY L.J. 277, 306-09 (1989)
(chronicling the Court's opinions addressing where federal regulation of natural gas ends and
where state regulation begins).
29. J. TOMAIN, J. HICKEY & S. HOLLIS, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY, 166 (1988) [herein-
after J. TOMAIN]. A utility's operating costs typically comprise 75% to 80% of its rate. Id
30. See Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 200.
31. Id.
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dustrial customers can switch between using fuel oil and natural gas for their
energy needs, industrial customers have an intermittent or elastic demand
for natural gas.32 Residential consumers have a steadier, inelastic demand
for natural gas.33 Because of the LDC's obligation to serve, a4 its facilities
are constructed to provide natural gas concurrently for both residential and
industrial customers. At times of limited industrial use, local pipeline facili-
ties would sit idle unless the LDC had residential consumers to serve. Thus,
because the residential customers offset some of the LDC's costs, the indus-
trial customers benefit from the LDC's residential consumers. Residential
consumers likewise benefit when industrial customers use the LDC's system;
with more users on its system, the LDC has a larger group from which to
recover its fixed costs. As a result, the LDC allocates a smaller portion of its
fixed costs to each customer.
Utilities are state authorized monopolies.15 Many state utility commis-
sions grant LDCs exclusive franchises to serve particular geographic areas to
avoid having competing LDC pipeline facilities criss-crossing their states.a6
The issuance of an exclusive franchise, however, requires the LDC to serve
any person requesting service and commits the LDC to regulatory over-
sight.37 This requirement is often referred to as the public service obliga-
tion.38 Because of the public service obligation, the LDC must be ready to
provide service to all possible customers, and must maintain adequate sup-
plies or "contract demand" of natural gas to serve all of its customers.
39
Moreover, an LDC often remains obligated to purchase its contract demand
from its pipeline, regardless of customer demand.
State utility commissions regulate the LDCs' rates to ensure that the
LDCs do not exploit their monopoly position.' In setting an LDC's rates,
the state utility commission reviews the LDC's costs and sets a rate that
allows the LDC the opportunity to cover incurred costs and to earn a rea-
sonable rate of return on its capital investment.41 The rate typically consists
32. Id. at 185.
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
35. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 12 (1964); J. TOMAIN,
supra note 29, at 159 (1988).
36. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjOY, supra note 35, at 12.
37. Id. at 13; see also J. TOMAIN, supra note 29, at 159.
38. J. TOMAIN, supra note 29, at 159.
39. Id.; see also P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoY, supra note 35, at 13.
40. See A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, VOLUME 1, 21 (1970); J. TOMAIN,
supra note 29, at 165-66.
41. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 690 (1923); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898); see also J. TOMAIN, supra note
29, at 159-66. Under basic rate making methodologies, utilities such as LDCs are guaranteed
[Vol. 39:11571162
Distributor Bypass in Natural Gas Industry
of two parts: A fixed cost, for example, a monthly service charge; and a
commodity cost, for example, a charge for each additional unit of natural
gas purchased.42 In setting the LDC's rates, a state utility commission often
requires an LDC to maintain different rates for different categories of cus-
tomers.43 Many state utility commissions, in an effort to keep residential
rates low, choose to allocate some of the costs LDCs incur in serving resi-
dential customers to the LDCs' industrial customers."
B. The Structure of an LDC Bypass
Because of the uneven allocation of costs, some industrial customers be-
come dissatisfied with their LDC rate and seek more competitively priced
natural gas alternatives.45 Industrial LDC customers who have the capabil-
ity to construct a direct hookup to the interstate pipeline can bypass the
LDC. The industrial customer can thus avoid the "middleman," and mark-
up, by purchasing lower priced natural gas directly from the interstate pipe-
line." In order to bypass the LDC, however, the customer must not only
the opportunity to recover these fixed costs through their rates. J. TOMAIN, supra note 29, at
166. The methodologies used to set the rates are based on cost, investment, margin or, most
recently, on the level of competition existing in a utility's market area. Id.
42. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, supra note 18, at 180.
43. State utility commissions often use their authority to set rates to achieve political as
well as economic ends. J. TOMAIN, supra note 29, at 164. For example, state utility commis-
sions can, and often do, allocate a disproportionate share of the LDC's fixed costs to the indus-
trial customers to keep the rates of the residential consumers at the level the commissions
perceive to be reasonable. Professor Tomain lists four goals to consider in rate setting: Ensur-
ing reliable public service, controlling monopoly power, avoiding economic waste, and redis-
tributing wealth. Id at 161-62; see also A. KAHN, supra note 40, at 55-56. Professor Kahn
suggests that:
All too often, from the economist's standpoint, the commissions resolve such contro-
versies on bases other than economic efficiency, seeking to protect offended competi-
tors from excessive losses of business, to preserve a "fair share" of the market for
each, to strike some equitable or politically acceptable distribution of common costs
among the various classes of patrons.
Id.
44. See Pierce, supra note 20, at 49; see also S. WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL GAS REVOLU-
TION OF 1985 25 (1985).
45. See Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 182.
46. Bypass can actually occur in several forms. For example, while bypass is generally a
method through which a customer changes from its traditional seller to another seller, bypass
can also be achieved by the customer manufacturing its own supplies (synthetic gas), thereby
eliminating the need for the seller's services. Additionally, bypass can be achieved by the
customer switching from natural gas to an alternate fuel supply. See Broadman & Kalt, supra
note 11, at 195. This Comment does not analyze these types of bypass, but analyzes LDC
bypass in the context of an industrial enduser constructing a direct hookup with an interstate
pipeline and where the LDC is willing and able to continue to serve the industrial enduser.
1990] 1163
Catholic University Law Review
possess the financial resources to pay for the hookup,47 but also must have a
high volume demand for gas to warrant the hookup costs. Further, the cus-
tomer must have the market experience and expertise to operate the hookup
and arrange for natural gas supplies.48 Because of the expense involved, the
only customers realistically able to bypass the LDC are larger industrial cus-
tomers; these customers, in contrast to the residential consumers, are more
likely to have the resources, the demand, and the business acumen necessary
to bypass the LDC. Residential consumers and small commercial endusers,
unable to afford or warrant a direct hookup with the interstate pipeline, will
remain limited or "captive" to the LDC. Furthermore, they will remain
captive to the LDC's costs. As industrial customers leave the LDC system,
costs previously paid by the departing customers shift to the remaining cus-
tomers. As a result, remaining customers experience higher rates.49 Higher
rates can cause industrial customers not contemplating bypass to consider
bypassing the LDC. As more customers leave the system, more costs shift to
the remaining customers, resulting in a spiraling increase in natural gas
rates.50
Although LDC bypass negatively affects the residential consumers, the
LDC bypass may carry certain economic benefits. 51 An industrial customer
will bypass the LDC if, by doing so, it can purchase gas at lower rates.-2
Thus, if an industrial customer can get cheaper fuel, it may pass the benefit
of the lower fuel costs on to its customers or to its employees through either
a decrease in the price of its manufactured product or, alternatively, by pay-
ing higher wages to its employees, hiring more employees, or avoiding em-
47. For example, in one LDC bypass case, the cost of installing six feet of pipeline facili-
ties was $81,000. Northern Natural Gas Co., 46 F.E.R.C. 61,270 at 61,792 (1989).
An application requesting authority to construct the pipeline hookup requires a $26,260
filing fee, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,900 (1990), and an applicant must comply with environmental re-
quirements, 18 C.F.R. § 2.69 (1990), which can become costly. Considering these costs, a
direct hookup with an interstate pipeline is not a viable option for most residential natural gas
consumers.
48. Vlcek & Bushee, The Conflict Over Interstate Pipelines' Bypass of Gas Distributors, 4
ABA NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENV'T 18, 19 (Summer 1989); see also Mogel & Gregg,
Appropriateness of Imposing Common Carrier Status on Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 4
ENERGY L.J. 155, 183 (1983); Note, Freeing the Captives: Nondiscriminatory Access to Trans-
portation in the Interstate Natural Gas Market, 47 U. PIrr. L. REV. 843, 867 n. 158 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 63,009, at 65,039 (1987) (predict-
ing that a bypass in this proceeding will result in the LDC suffering a loss of $51 million in
annual revenues and that the loss would be made up by shifting the costs to customers remain-
ing on the system).
50. Id
51. See Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 204-06.
52. See, e.g., id at 204 (stating that "[b]eneficial rate effects result from the ability of
actual or prospective bypass to lower the marginal expense of delivered gas to bypassing end-
users").
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ployee layoffs.53 Moreover, when fuel costs are high, an industrial customer
may shutdown its operations if it is unable to cover its fuel costs.5 4 Ob-
taining cheaper fuel via a bypass may enable the industrial enduser to remain
in operation and continue to contribute to the local economy as an employer
and a taxpayer. 5 Ultimately, however, while these positive effects of bypass
are indirect and speculative, the negative effects are more direct and certain.
An industrial customer can bypass an LDC via one of several regulatory
mechanisms. First, under section 7 of the NGA, the interstate pipeline
bypassing the LDC to the industrial customer could request a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from the Commission. 6 This traditional
certification process is time consuming and expensive.5 7 In the alternative,
the pipeline could request a certificate pursuant to the Commission's op-
tional expedited certificate (OEC) regulations.5" The OEC procedure was
designed to be faster than the traditional process because Commission re-
view under the OEC procedure is less stringent than review of a section 7
certificate application. Finally, the pipeline could bypass the LDC under the
self-implementing authority provided in section 311 of the Natural Gas Pol-
icy Act of 1978.5' Under section 311, an interstate pipeline can transport
53. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 63,009, at 63,043.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1988). Section 7(c) requires that a party must obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity before it commences service and before it constructs facili-
ties to effect the service. Id.; see infra note 79.
57. See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 1250, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (indicat-
ing that the section 7 process requires burdensome and extensive filings and administrative
hearings before the transaction can commence), cert. denied sub. nom Berkshire Gas Co. v.
Assoc. Gas Distribs., 111 S. Ct. 277, 278 (1990).
58. The OEC mechanism was created in Order No. 436. See infra text accompanying
notes 139-43. The OEC procedures are codified at 18 C.F.R. § 157.100 to 157.106 (1990).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 3371 (1988). In relevant parts, section 311 provides:
(a) Commission approval of transportation.-
(1) Interstate pipelines.-
(A) In general.
The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any interstate pipe-
line to transport natural gas on behalf of-
(i) any intrastate pipeline; and
(ii) any local distribution company.
(2) Intrastate pipelines.
(A) In general.
The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any intrastate pipe-
line to transport natural gas on behalf of -
(i) any interstate pipeline; and
(ii) any local distribution company served by any interstate pipeline.
1990] 1165
Catholic University Law Review
and sell natural gas "on behalf of" an intrastate pipeline or an LDC without
obtaining prior approval from the Commission.' This method provides the
quickest and easiest manner of bypass and many of the bypass cases are
pursuant to section 311.61
II. THE NATURAL GAS ACT OF 1938
Prior to 1938, the interstate natural gas market was largely unregulated.62
Relatively few interstate natural gas pipelines spanned the nation, and those
pipelines that did so had a tight grip on their markets.63 Several states had
attempted to regulate the sale of natural gas into their jurisdictions by setting
the rates that interstate pipelines could charge in-state consumers.64 Be-
cause the sale of natural gas from outside state borders to in-state consumers
(b) Commission approval of sales.
(1) In general.
The Commission may, by rule or order, authorize any intrastate pipeline to sell
natural gas to -
(A) any interstate pipeline; and
(B) any local distribution company served by any interstate pipeline.
60. The pipeline need only report to the Commission within 30 days of the commence-
ment of the transaction. 18 C.F.R. § 284.106(a) (1990).
61. Bypass achieved through section 311 may have been limited by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Associated Gas Distributors, 899 F.2d
at 1250. Under section 311, an interstate pipeline can transport or sell natural gas to an indus-
trial customer if the pipeline is transporting or selling the gas "on behalf of" an intrastate
pipeline or an LDC. 15 U.S.C. § 3371(a)(1) (1988). The Commission previously interpreted
the "on behalf of" clause to require only that the party on whose behalf the gas is transported
receive "some economic benefit" from the transaction. Hadson Gas Sys., Inc., 44 F.E.R.C.
61,082 at 61,250 (1988), reh'g, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,286 (1988). Under the Commission's stan-
dard, a pipeline could serve an industrial customer on behalf of an LDC without any physical
connection to the transaction. In Associated Gas Distributors, the court rejected the Commis-
sion's broad "some economic benefit" test. The court reasoned that section 311 is a limited
exception to section 7, and that the Commission's broad reading of section 311 undermined the
section 7 certificate process. Associated Gas Distributors, 899 F.2d at 1261. Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to the Commission to fashion an appropriate standard. On remand,
the Commission issued an interim rule revising its section 311 test. Interim Revisions to Regu-
lations Governing Transportation Under Section 311 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
and Blanket Transportation Certificates, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,002 (1990) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. §§ 284.102, 284.223). The interim regulations require that the "on behalf of" party
either: (1) have physical custody of the gas at some point in the transaction; or (2) hold title to
the gas at some point during the transaction. Id. at 33,006. Further, if the party on whose
behalf the gas is transported only holds title to the natural gas and not physical custody, it
must hold title to the gas "for ... purpose[s] related to its status as an LDC or intrastate
pipeline." Id The Commission has also requested comments to further develop the standard.
55 Fed. Reg. 33,017 (1990). The court's order limiting section 311 could eliminate up to one-
third of section 311 transactions. Inside F.E.R.C., (McGraw-Hill) Aug. 13, 1990, at 3.
62. See Pierce, supra note 20, at 6.
63. Pierce, supra note 19, at 345.
64. Pierce, supra note 20, at 5.
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was interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
states' attempts to regulate the natural gas industry as violative of the com-
merce clause. 65 The Court's opinions not only secured the monopoly posi-
tion of the few interstate pipelines that served the United States, but also
prevented state authorities from protecting their consumers from monopolis-
tic market conditions. 6
The states whose consumers were subject to the unfair practices of the
interstate pipelines did not end their fight with the Court opinions. Alleging
that the interstate pipelines engaged in price or transportation discrimina-
tion against them, LDCs and state agencies complained to Congress about
the dominant market power of the interstate pipelines and the states' lack of
power to protect their consumers.68 In response to state and consumer com-
plaints and pleas for assistance, Congress asked the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) to investigate the market practices of interstate natural gas
pipelines.69
The FTC reported that interstate pipelines regularly engaged in unfair and
discriminatory practices against LDCs and, ultimately, natural gas consum-
ers. 70 Moreover, because of the size of the interstate pipelines and the lack
of pipeline competitors, the FIC concluded that interstate pipelines exer-
cised monopoly power.7 ' The FTC also found that because of Supreme
Court decisions that solidified the pipelines' market power,72 state utility
commissions and consumers were helpless in controlling the power of the
interstate pipelines. According to the FTC, a federal response was necessary
to curtail the monopolistic practices of interstate pipelines and to provide
consumer protection.73
65. Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1924);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); see also Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 86 (1927) (rejecting the state's attempt to regulate the electric-
ity industry as a violation of the commerce clause).
66. See Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 887 F.2d 1295, 1299
(6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1806 (1990).
67. Id.
68. Pierce, supra note 20, at 5.
69. Interestingly, the FTC had previously recommended to Congress that it regulate pro-
ducers and interstate pipelines in 1928. However, the Congress of 1928 apparently was not
interested in imposing any controls on the industry. See Fox, supra note 7, at 114 n.9.
70. S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 84-A (1936).
71. Id. at 615-16.
72. Id. at 616-17.
73. Id at 617; see also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (194) (analyzing
legislative history to determine the NGA's role as a consumer protection statute).
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Responding to the lack of competition in the natural gas market identified
in the FTC report, Congress passed the NGA in 1938. Congress' primary
goals in enacting the NGA were "to protect consumers against... exploita-
tion at the hands of [interstate pipelines]"' 7" and "to afford consumers a com-
plete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and
charges."' 76 Under the NGA, the Commission regulates the natural gas in-
dustry in the absence of competition, to ensure the types of consumer protec-
tion that a true competitive market may provide." While the NGA gave the
Commission control over the sale and transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce, the NGA specifically left to state commissions the power to
regulate retail sales of natural gas within the state.78
Pursuant to section 7 of the NGA, the Commission regulates the trans-
portation of natural gas in interstate commerce by requiring interstate pipe-
lines to obtain a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" before
commencing service.79 This provision also requires interstate pipelines to
seek approval prior to terminating or "abandoning" pipeline facilities, sales,
and transportation service.80 The Commission has developed its bypass pol-
icy under its section 7 authority.
III. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT LDC BYPASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COMMISSION'S HISTORIC PREFERENCE
AGAINST LDC BYPASS
Under section 7 of the NGA, the Commission can refuse to permit an
interstate pipeline to sell or transport natural gas in interstate commerce if it
finds that the transaction is not in the "public convenience and necessity. '""
74. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1988); see also FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S.
621, 631 (1972).
75. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 610.
76. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959).
77. See A. KAHN, supra note 40, at 20.
78. See supra note 3.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1988). In pertinent part section 7f(c)(1)(A) provides:
No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon
completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transporta-
tion or the sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or un-
dertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate
any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such
natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the
Commission authorizing such acts or operations ....
Id
80. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1988).
81. See id § 717f(c)(1)(A); supra note 79.
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In a series of early cases, the Commission 2 rejected bypass proposals and
held that increased costs to consumers, diminution in quality of service, and
duplication of facilities weigh heavily against LDC bypass being in the "pub-
lic convenience and necessity."
For example, in American Louisiana Pipe Line Co.,1 3 the FPC refused to
permit an interstate pipeline to hookup directly with industrial customers
already being served by an LDC because the bypass would increase the rates
of natural gas to the LDC's residential consumers. In American Louisiana, a
number of interstate pipelines filed applications pursuant to section 7 of the
NGA requesting certificates to construct pipeline facilities and to transport
and sell natural gas in interstate commerce.8 4 One of the pipeline applicants,
Midwestern Gas Transmissions Company (Midwestern), requested authority
to sell natural gas directly to several steel plants near Chicago. 5 Three
LDCs already served those steel mills. The LDCs opposed Midwestern's
proposed bypass and argued that direct sales "would displace very large and
important off-peak sales" made by the LDCs to the steel mills.8 6 They indi-
cated that the gas sales to the steel mills accounted for 10% of their annual
sales.
8 7
Rejecting Midwestern's proposal to serve the steel factories directly, the
Commission held that the proposed hookup was not "consistent with the
public convenience and necessity."8 8 Specifically, the agency acknowledged
the harm of bypass to the LDCs and, more significantly, the harm to the
LDCs' remaining customers in the form of higher rates.89 Therefore, be-
cause the LDCs' remaining customers would have been adversely affected by
the bypass, the Commission was unwilling to permit the bypass to occur.9°
The Commission has also refused to permit LDC bypass where the facili-
ties necessary to bypass the LDC would duplicate existing pipeline facilities.
82. Congress created the Commission in 1978 to replace the Federal Power Commission
(FPC). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7171-7178 (1988). The Commission assumed the FPC's docket and
agency precedent. This Comment refers to both the FPC and the current Commission as
"Commission."
83. 20 F.P.C. 575, 592 (1958).
84. Id. at 579.




89. Id. The Commission found "[t]he steel sales are important to the distributors, for
such interruptible sales improve the load factors to the benefit of the low load factor commer-
cial and domestic consumers. It is indicated that loss of the steel sales might require the
distributing companies to raise their rates." Id.
90. Id. The Commission also refused to permit the bypass because it would "disturb the
market balance which now exists between industrial and residential customers." Id; see also
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 771, 778 (1965).
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The Commission has avoided facility duplication because installing two dif-
ferent pipeline facilities to perform a function that one set of facilities could
achieve results in economic waste and increased costs for consumers.91 In
Southern Natural Gas Co.,92 Southern Natural, an interstate pipeline, pro-
posed to sell natural gas directly to two industrial customers in Georgia.
The industrial customers, however, were within the service territory of an
LDC already served by Southern Natural.93 The LDC offered to substitute
its service for the service proposed by Southern Natural. The Commission
concluded that Southern Natural's bypass of the LDC was not in the public
convenience and necessity.94
Before the Commission addressed the case, a Commission examiner" re-
viewed the facts and found that the LDC, South Atlantic, rather than the
interstate pipeline, Southern Natural, should sell the gas to the two compa-
nies to prevent cost shifting and duplication of facilities.96 On review of the
examiner's findings, however, the Commission clarified the examiner's deci-
sion, emphasizing that the Commission did not maintain a policy that a dis-
tributor, rather than the interstate pipeline, must always serve the industrial
customers in its service territory.9 Instead, the Commission held that by-
pass proposals would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The Commission
further explained, however, that it would not approve a bypass that would
result in a duplication of facilities and an increase in the rates of remaining
customers. 98
91. See, e.g., Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 206-07; see also A. KAHN, supra note
40, at 119-23.
92. 25 F.P.C. 925, 926 (1961).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The examiner was a precursor to the current Administrative Law Judge. See 18
C.F.R. § 385.102(c) (1990).
96. Southern Natural, 25 F.P.C. at 937. The examiner found:
In principle, lines of interstate transmission companies should not be laid down on
top of local distribution lines for the service of profitable industrial load that can be
served by the local distributor. On the contrary, such load, absent unusual circum-
stances not now foreseen, should be served by the distribution company, to the bene-
fit of the local consumers in respect of (a) its increased revenues and profits taken
into account by State Commissions in fixing rates and (b) its improved load factor,
reducing its unit cost of service.
Id. (citing American La., 20 F.P.C. at 588, 592 (1958)).
97. Id. at 927.
98. Id. The Commission held:
[Where the local distributor indicates that it is willing and able to serve a particular
industrial customer located in the area covered by the distributor's existing system,
there is certainly no reason, absent the unusual circumstances mentioned by the ex-
aminer, for the Commission to authorize duplicative construction of facilities by the
interstate pipeline to serve an industrial customer which can be served adequately by
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While the Commission shied away from announcing an agency policy
against LDC bypass, Southern Natural clearly reflected an agency preference
for LDCs to service industrial customers where additional costs can be
avoided.9 9 The benefits to the LDC's customers, lower costs resulting from
additional high load customers on the system and increased revenue gener-
ated by industrial users, figured prominently in the Commission's prefer-
ence. "o Likewise, the prevention of duplicate facilities spanning service
areas and the resulting economic waste were significant factors in the Com-
mission's early LDC bypass orders.' °1
In a later case, the Commission strengthened its LDC bypass preference.
In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,' 2 the Commission once again ad-
dressed an LDC bypass when Panhandle sought a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity to render natural gas service to a brick manufacturer
in Fulton, Missouri. The City of Fulton, a municipal natural gas distributor,
filed an application requesting authority to provide the same service. Fulton
asked that Panhandle's application be denied or, in the alternative, that Pan-
handle be ordered to provide the service to Fulton, which, in turn, would
provide the service to the brick manufacturer.'0 3 Reasoning that Panhandle
would best serve the brick maker, the examiner determined that Panhandle's
application should be approved."°4
the local distributor with accompanying benefits to the ultimate consumer and with-
out detriment to the pipeline.
Id; see also Transwestern Pipeline Co., 36 F.P.C. 176, 201 (1966) (holding that "absent unu-
sual circumstances, there is no reason to certificate duplicate service to particular industrial
customers where the local distributor indicates it is willing and able to serve"), aff'd per
curiam, 387 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 909 (1968).
99. Southern Natural, 25 F.P.C. at 927.
100. Id.
101. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the disadvantages of LDC by-
pass. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329 (1951).
The Court, in holding that a state utility commission could regulate the bypass of an LDC,
acknowledged that if the bypass were permitted, not only would there be two utilities using
local facilities to accommodate their distribution systems, but also that the utilities would be
seeking to serve the same industrial consumers. The Court stated:
[The pipeline] asserts a right to compete for the cream of the volume business with-
out regard to the local public convenience or necessity. Were [the pipeline] success-
ful in this venture, it would no doubt be reflected adversely in [the LDC's] over-all
costs of service and its rates to customers whose only source of supply is [the LDC].
Id. at 334. Therefore, the Court's concern was similar to the Commission's: if the pipeline is
permitted to "skim the cream" of the LDC's customers and serve them directly, the remaining
customers would unfairly be stuck with higher rates. Id
102. 36 F.P.C. 1107 (1966), reh'g, 37 F.P.C. 314, aff'd, Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v.
FPC, 386 F.2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1967).
103. Id. at 1108.
104. Id. at 1125.
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Citing the deficiency of the record developed at the hearing, however, the
Commission rejected the examiner's findings.'05 Instead, the Commission,
departing from its hesitancy in Southern Natural to announce a policy
against LDC bypass, stated: "[o]ur policy to favor service to industrial cus-
tomers by local distributors is well established." ' "°6 Applying that "policy"
to Panhandle's and Fulton's applications, the Commission ordered Panhan-
dle to serve Fulton to enable the City to serve the brick manufacturer."17
The series of cases addressing LDC bypass reveal a Commission prefer-
ence for the LDC, rather than the interstate pipeline, to serve industrial cus-
tomers. In developing its preference, increased costs to remaining
consumers after the bypassing customer departed was a significant factor in
the Commission's analysis. The cases reveal that the Commission's LDC
preference was not designed necessarily to protect the LDCs from market
powers. Rather, the preference was designed to protect residential consum-
ers, the ones most harmed by LDC bypass.108 Further, while the Commis-
sion did not automatically reject all LDC bypass proposals in the early cases,
it did consider the impact of bypasses on all segments of the natural gas
industry and acted to protect adversely affected segments.
105. Id. at 1109.
106. Id. at 1109 (citing Northern Natural Gas Co., 33 F.P.C. 501 (1965); Southern Natural
Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 925 (1961); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 13 F.P.C. 301 (1954)).
107. Idl
108. This distinction is borne out by the fact that the LDC preference would not be in-
voked if the LDC's residential customer would benefit from the bypass. In Alabama Gas
Corp. v. Southern Natural, 49 F.P.C. 686 (1973), an LDC asked the Commission to order an
interstate pipeline to serve three industrial customers through the LDC rather than to sell gas
directly to the customers. 49 F.P.C. 686. The LDC asserted that the Commission's LDC
preference required the LDC to serve the customers. Id The Commission rejected the LDC's
request. Although the Commission acknowledged its policy "to favor service to industrial
customers through local distributors," it also acknowledged that "[t]he policy of this Commis-
sion which protects the right of the local distributor to render sales to industrial customers
within its area of service is conditional-it does not apply if economic considerations preclude
it." Id. (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 36 F.P.C. 1107, 1112 (1966)). The economic
considerations that the Commission relied on in refusing to order the pipeline to use the LDC
were the impact on the pipeline of losing the direct sales service and the concern that, if the
LDC had too much industrial load, then the LDC's high-priority customers would be harmed
during curtailment periods. Id. at 687. Significantly, even when the Commission did not order
use of the LDC, the impact of the bypass proposal on the residential consumer was a factor in
the Commission's analysis. That is why the Commission, in other LDC bypass proceedings,
maintained that it would not rigidly adhere to the LDC preference, and that it would review
each proposed LDC bypass on a case-by-case basis. See also Missouri Edison Co., 47 F.P.C.
849, 851-52 (1972) (considering economic and gas supply considerations for both industrial
and residential customers).
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IV. CHANGES IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET: AGENCY RESPONSES
TO THE DEVELOPING MARKET AND THE COMMISSION'S
RESULTANT CHANGE IN LDC BYPASS PREFERENCE
Lack of competition in the natural gas market for consumers prompted
Congress to enact the NGA.1° In the years after 1938, and particularly
since the late 1970's, the interstate natural gas market changed radically. In
certain sections of the market, competitive forces increased and direct gov-
ernmental control over the market as a means to prevent monopoly pres-
sures became anachronistic. 10
One way the natural gas industry changed was through the development
of a competitive market at the wellhead. As the Commission sought to regu-
late the interstate market under the NGA, the intrastate market was left to
state regulation. Because producers and pipelines could charge higher, un-
regulated prices for gas not entering the interstate market,"' some refused
to sell their natural gas on the interstate gas market.1 12 Producers and pipe-
lines could choose either to sell or transport gas in interstate commerce at
relatively lower regulated prices and be subject to the full panoply of Com-
mission regulations, or to limit their activities to the intrastate market where
they could sell their gas at higher prices without having to comply with
federal controls. Consequently, while natural gas was plentiful on the intra-
state market, natural gas shortages developed on the interstate market.
11 3
In response to chronic natural gas shortages, Congress passed the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). 1 4 Congress' goal under the NGPA was
to encourage production of natural gas to satisfy demand on the interstate
109. Natural Gas Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938); see supra notes 62-
80 and accompanying text.
110. See Pierce, supra note 19, at 348. Professor Pierce argues that regulation of the natu-
ral gas market can no longer be based on a "monopoly rationale." Instead, he maintains that
changes in the market in recent years have resulted in a sufficiently competitive market which
no longer justifies direct governmental market regulation. Id.
111. Between 1969 and 1976, the price of natural gas on the interstate market increased
600%, from 19.8 cents per Mcf to $1.42 per Mcf. Gas on the intrastate market, however,
increased over 1,200%, from 18 cents per Mcf to $2.39 per Mcf. See S. REP. No. 436, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
112. See Fox, supra note 7, at 116.
113. Id.; see also Note, Deregulation and Natural Gas Purchase Contracts: Examination
Through Neoclassical and Relational Contract Theories, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 45 (1985).
The natural gas shortages on the interstate market became particularly acute during the energy
crises of the 1970s brought on by oil shortages, and when historical purchasers of fuel oil
attempted to switch from oil to natural gas for their energy needs. At the same time, the
demand for natural gas increased to comply with air quality standards. Id. at 44 n. 12.
114. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3432 (1988), §§ 3311-3333 repealed by Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, 103 Stat.
157 (1989) (repeal effective January 1, 1993); see also Pierce, supra note 20, at 11.
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market.1 5 To increase gas supplies, Congress raised the wellhead price of
natural gas to more competitive levels and set economic incentives for pro-
ducers to produce more gas.' 16 The NGPA also eliminated price controls
on certain categories of gas effective January 1, 1985,' '7 and designated an-
other category of gas for deregulation in 1987.118 Congress also eliminated
the distinction between the interstate and intrastate market that contributed
to shortages on the interstate market. Pursuant to the NGPA, parties may
transport natural gas in the interstate market without becoming subject to
NGA jurisdiction." 9
During the phased decontrol mandated by the NGPA, the natural gas
market changed rapidly. The chronic natural gas shortages of the early and
mid-1970's developed into a surplus by the early 1980's.2O The surplus,
however, was of "new" gas, which, under the NGPA, was priced considera-
bly higher than the regulated "old" gas supplies. Simultaneously, as produc-
tion of natural gas increased, demand decreased.1 2 ' During the shortage,
interstate pipelines signed long-term contracts with natural gas producers to
"lock-in" supplies of the new gas.' 22 Once demand declined, the interstate
pipelines remained obligated to purchase large volumes of high priced natu-
ral gas pursuant to long-term contracts. Because the price was so high and
overall demand was declining, few customers were willing to take the
supplies.
One result of the market changes was the development of the "spot mar-
ket" for natural gas.' 2 3 In the spot market, producers attempted to sell their
gas for short-terms and at prices lower than contract prices. 124 The spot
115. See Fox, supra note 7, at 116.
116. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3312 (ceiling prices for new natural gas and certain natural gas
produced from Outer Continental Shelf); id. § 3313 (ceiling price for new, onshore production
wells); id. § 3314 (ceiling price for sales of natural gas dedicated to interstate commerce).
117. Id. § 3331(a).
118. Id. § 3331(c).
119. Id. §§ 3371, 3431. While the NGPA deregulated the price of certain categories of
natural gas in interstate commerce, sections 4 and 5 of the NGA still regulate prices to ensure
that they are "just and reasonable." 15 U.S.C. § 717(c), (d) (1988).
120. Pierce, supra note 20, at 12. Professor Pierce argues that the shortage which
prompted passage of the NGPA did not exist right before the NGPA was passed. Id. The
General Accounting Office found that a natural gas surplus developed on the market as early
as 1981. NATURAL GAS PRICE INCENTIVES: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, REPORT BY THE
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-76, at 27-28 (1982).
121. Stalon & Lock, State - Federal Regulations in the Economic Regulation of Energy, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 427, 487 (1990); Comment, Freeing the Captives: Nondiscriminatory Access
to Transportation in the Interstate Natural Gas Market, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 843, 848 (1985).
122. Pierce, supra note 19, at 354.
123. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,412.
124. See Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,419-20.
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market was significant because volumes of gas became available for short-
term sales at prices generally less expensive than gas sold subject to long-
term purchase contracts. 125 As the gas spot market developed and natural
gas prices decreased, however, consumers were largely unable to take advan-
tage of the additional lower priced spot market supplies.1 26 Traditionally,
the natural gas market operated this way: pipelines purchased gas from pro-
ducers, and then transported and resold the gas to LDCs for consumers
under long-term gas supply contracts. Because pipelines also had long-term
purchase contracts on the production end of their pipelines obligating them
to buy volumes at above-market levels, pipelines were reluctant to relieve
LDCs of any purchase obligations that would permit them to purchase the
cheaper gas.127 Further, for natural gas produced under their long-term
purchase contracts, pipelines were required to pay up to seventy to ninety
percent of the price of gas, whether or not the pipeline took the gas.1 28
These take-or-pay clauses made pipelines more reluctant to release custom-
ers from purchase obligations.
Consumers had no opportunity to transport gas from the producing area
to the consuming area; they sat on one end of the interstate pipeline and
remained unable to take advantage of lower gas prices.129 They were also
paying above market prices for pipeline gas.130
Recognizing the new competitive forces on the production end of the mar-
ket caused by the NGPA, the Commission promulgated a series of rulemak-
ings in an attempt to bring the evolving competitive forces at the wellhead
125. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,419.
126. Comment, supra note 121, at 848.
127. Stalon & Lock, supra note 121, at 488-89.
128. The impact of the "take-or-pay" liability on the natural gas market has been enor-
mous. However, the Commission only recently attempted to address the multi-billion dollar
take-or-pay obligations which have accrued over the last few years. Order No. 500, Interim
Rule and Statement of Policy, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987), aff'd, American Gas Ass'n v.
FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
129. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,421. The pipelines were reluctant to provide their
transportation services to customers without fuel-switching capability, such as residential and
commercial customers. Id.
130. See Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also
Pierce, supra note 19, at 351 (noting that as of 1983, interstate pipelines were purchasing
"new" gas pursuant to long-term contracts at $10 per Mcf while gas on the spot market was
selling for market clearing prices between $3 and $4 per Mcf).
13 1. See supra note 6. In addition to issuing rulemaking orders, the Commission also ex-
perimented with innovative sale and transportation programs to bring some flexibility to the
interstate market. One of the innovations was the Special Marketing Program (SMP). Colum-
bia Gulf Transmission Co., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,220 (1983). Under an SMP, a pipeline could
arrange with its producer-seller to release the pipeline from take-or-pay obligations in ex-
change for the pipeline's transportion of surplus supplies to industrial customers that otherwise
would not have purchased natural gas. Pipelines benefitted from the SMPs because the SMPs
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downstream to the consuming end of the natural gas market. Of these
rulemakings, Order No. 436 was the most significant action taken by the
Commission in the post-NGPA era.' 32
The Commission promulgated Order No. 436 to increase competition in
the natural gas marketplace. 133 The Commission attempted to convert an
industry previously controlled by governmental regulation into an industry
where competition would control the market. 134 Because of an increase in
the number of interstate pipelines serving customers, a significant change
from the market conditions which prompted Congress to pass the NGA, the
Commission asserted that concerns regarding monopoly and discriminatory
practices of pipelines were alleviated in the natural gas market of the
1980's.' a3 According to the Commission, the new market required less di-
rect governmental intervention and the Commission could rely on market
competition rather than regulation to protect consumers.
Order No. 436's main objective was to permit consumers to take advan-
tage of the competitive market in the production fields by requiring inter-
state pipelines to provide "open access" contract carriage of natural gas.
136
The interstate pipeline would "unbundle" their transportation and sales
services and offer them separately. Thereafter, rather than being limited to
purchasing high-priced contract gas from the pipeline, LDCs and industrial
customers could purchase inexpensive natural gas on the spot market di-
rectly from producers, and request pipelines to transport the gas for a trans-
portation fee. 13' To avoid the locked-in contract problems that had
precluded pipelines from allowing customers to purchase gas elsewhere, the
relieved the pipeline of the onerous take-or-pay obligations, and because new markets for natu-
ral gas alleviated the market surplus. After the pipelines' existing customers complained that
it was unfair that only certain customers were provided the cheaper surplus supplies, the Com-
mission permitted the pipelines' existing customers to take advantage of the SMPs; despite this
concession, not all of the customers were satisfied. A number of state agencies challenged the
SMPs because the residential consumer was not able to take advantage of the SMPs. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed and struck down
the SMPs. Maryland Peoples' Counsel v. FERC, 768 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The rejected
SMPs were the precursors of the Commission's Order No. 436.
132. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1006 (1988). "The Order envisages a complete restructuring of the natural gas indus-
try. It may well come to rank with the three great regulatory milestones of the industry ......
Id. For a thorough analysis of Order No. 436, see Fox, supra note 7.
133. See Fox, supra note 7, at 118.
134. See Stalon & Lock, supra note 121, at 489; Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,413.
135. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,412 (indicating that pipeline to pipeline competi-
tion is a common phenomenon).
136. Id. at 42,424; see also Broadman & Kalt, supra note 11, at 184.
137. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,425.
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Order permitted customers to modify their contracts with the pipelines to
trade sales service for transportation service.
138
Another major aspect of Order No. 436 was the creation of a new pipeline
certificate mechanism allowing pipelines to provide the anticipated new
transportation. The optional expedited certificate procedure (OEC) 13 9 al-
lows a pipeline to construct facilities without having to satisfy certain re-
quirements otherwise needed to meet the NGA's section 7 public
convenience and necessity standard."4 Thus, under the OEC procedure, an
applicant can request authority to bypass an LDC and face less rigorous
public convenience and necessity review. ' 4 ' One of the reasons the Commis-
sion proposed a limited review of OEC applications was that the pipeline
constructing the facilities would assume the risk of the project. 142
In addressing the decreased regulatory oversight contained in the OEC
mechanism, the Commission first indicated a change in its historic LDC by-
pass preference. With its goal of economic efficiency, Order No. 436 reflects
the Commission's belief that competition, rather than government interven-
tion, will regulate the gas industry, and that players in the market that do
not compete will not be protected. 4 3 Thus, Order No. 436 embodies a sub-
stantial shift in the Commission's regulatory perspective. Instead of protect-
ing consumers against transactions that may directly increase rates, the
Commission now protects competition, and will not interfere in the changes
brought on by the new competitive marketplace.
138. 18 C.F.R. § 284.10 (1990). Under the Order, pipeline sales customers could convert a
percentage of their sales service to transportation service on the pipeline. Ir
§ 284. 10(c)(3)(ii)(A)-(E).
139. Id. § 157.104.
140. For example, the applicant may not be required to go through a formal administrative
hearing as mandated under section 7 of the NGA before the certificate is issued. Id
§ 157.104(b).
141. Under traditional section 7 certificate procedures, the applicant requesting the certifi-
cate has the burden to prove that the certificate is in the public convenience and necessity. 15
U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1988). Under the OEC procedure, however, the Commission presumes that
the certificate is in the public convenience and necessity and places the burden on those oppos-
ing the certificate to prove otherwise. 18 C.F.R. § 157.104(c). For a small LDC facing bypass,
the shift in burdens is significant, and may make defending against a bypass difficult.
142. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
143. Order No. 436 announced:
The Commission will not insulate the LDC markets from the competitive incen-
tives that are the foundation of [Order No. 436]. In order to promote economic
efficiency - a necessary factor in providing gas to consumers at the lowest reason-
able rates - the rule must provide sufficient competitive incentives to all elements of
the market. This means making all market participants, including LDCs, accounta-
ble for the success or failure of their market participation.
Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,469.
1990] 1177
Catholic University Law Review
After its promulgation, nearly every segment of the natural gas industry
sought appellate review of Order No. 436.144 In Associated Gas Distributors
v. FERC, '45 distributors and state utility commissions challenged the Com-
mission's shifting stance on LDC bypass announced in Order No. 436 on the
grounds that permitting LDC bypass would harm LDC customers in viola-
tion of congressional intent and prior Commission policy.'4" Specifically,
the LDCs and state commissions argued that customers having the capabil-
ity to bypass the LDC will do so and leave the remaining customers with an
increase in the costs incurred by the LDC.147 In Associated Gas Distributors,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
largely approved of Order No. 436, but vacated and remanded it to the
Commission because the court found fault with certain interdependent ele-
ments of the Order.'
48
In its opinion, the court upheld the Commission's new bypass policy. The
court indicated that although Order No. 436 made Commission approval of
LDC bypass more likely, the record contained little evidence that "industrial
consumers desired to bypass their LDCs."' 49 The court maintained that all
of the LDCs' customers desired competitive rates; thus, the only thing that
LDCs had to do to maintain these customers was to compete in the new
deregulated industry.' 50 Contrary to petitioners' arguments, the court deter-
mined that customers would not automatically be burdened with increased
costs. 15 Instead, the court reasoned that state utility commissions, under
their authority to regulate the rates LDCs charge their customers, could re-
duce the risk to LDC consumers by setting rates which would prevent the
LDCs from shifting the costs to remaining customers. 152 The court specu-
lated that state commissions could adopt rate structures to ensure cost-
based, competitive rates to protect residential consumers by requiring utility
144. Producers, pipelines, LDCs, and endusers collectively filed 85 briefs and the court
held two days of oral argument to hear the case. Associated Gas Distrib, 824 F.2d at 994.
145. Id. at 981.
146. Id. at 1035.
147. Id. These parties asserted that the pipelines would seek out "lucrative customers" or
"skim the cream" of the LDCs' customers and leave the LDCs with the less lucrative custom-
ers. Id.
148. Id. at 1044. Shortly after the court issued its mandate, however, the Commission
issued an interim rule and policy statement which reinstated those elements of Order No. 436
that the court approved. Order No. 500 Interim Rule and Statement of Policy, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,334 (1987), aff'd, American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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company shareholders to absorb the cost of a bypass.153 The court also pre-
dicted that the state utility commissions could exert jurisdiction over the
construction of any proposed bypass facility and require the new facility to
obtain a certificate from the state commission before commencing
operation. '
5 4
The petitioners argued that the Commission's reliance on state utility
commissions to fully protect residential consumers effectively delegated its
NGA obligations to the states. The court disagreed, and read the NGA as
simply a measure to fill a "regulatory gap" created by a series of pre-NGA
Supreme Court opinions. The court maintained that the Commission's ap-
parent "delegation" of consumer protection to the state commissions was
not inconsistent with the intent of the NGA's consumer protection role.' 55
Specifically, the court interpreted the NGA as only requiring the Commis-
sion "to facilitate the flow of competitively-priced gas into the hands of gas
consumers everywhere."' 56
Judge Mikva, in his dissent on the issue of LDC bypass,' 5 ' recognized that
states often require LDCs to subsidize consumer prices by charging higher
rates to industrial endusers. 15  He contended that state utility commissions
requiring LDCs to subsidize residential rates by setting higher rates for in-
dustrial customers increased the chances that the LDCs would be subject to
bypass.' 59 Judge Mikva asserted, however, that such subsidization to ensure
affordable rates for residential customers was common in utility ratemaking,
and that it was a "quintessential" local concern to be regulated by the state
153. Id at 1036.
154. Id. at 1035-36. The court relied on Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan
Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. 329 (1951), for the basis that state utility commissions
could retain jurisdiction over the bypassing transportation. Id. at 1035. The court acknowl-
edged, however, that the bounds of the Supreme Court's holding in Panhandle were "un-
plumbed," and it avoided determining the extent of the issue because the question was not
before it. Id. The protections anticipated by the court from Panhandle, however, are easily
circumvented and provide little protection to consumers. See infra text accompanying notes
192-195.
155. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
156. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1038. This interpretation could hardly be cor-
rect. In passing the NGA, Congress mandated just and reasonable rates, and not competitive
rates. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1988). By relying on competitive market forces rather than tradi-
tional utility ratemaking methods to establish "just and reasonable" rates, the Commission
failed to fulfill its statutory mandate. See, e.g., Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734
F.2d 1486, 1509-10 (D.C. Cir.) (indicating that "just and reasonable" requires more from an
agency than reliance on market competition), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
157. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1044 (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). Judge Mikva was particularly concerned with the majority's overbroad
"loose language and stray observations" of the natural gas industry. Id.
158. Id. at 1045.
159. Id
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utility commission. "6 Finally, Judge Mikva argued that the Commission's
change in policy and the majority's reliance on state commissions to remedy
adverse effects from LDC bypass improperly usurped the states' ability to
make such policy choices. 16
The Commission's shift away from the LDC preference, as demonstrated
in Order No. 436, appears to rest on the Commission's misperception that it
had, in its prior anti-bypass preference, protected the LDCs from competi-
tion for the LDCs' benefit.'6 2 Close inspection of the Commission's LDC
preference, however, reveals that the Commission developed the preference
not necessarily to protect the LDC, but to protect those customers without
the capability to bypass the LDC. Although the Commission accurately rec-
ognized that changes in the marketplace required decreased regulatory over-
sight for some, it did not recognize that for other segments of the market a
lack of competition still exists. Residential consumers cannot use the new
competitive market to their advantage. Therefore, the Commission's an-
nouncement in Order No. 436, indicating that it would not protect the
LDCs from competition and that "all market participants [would be] ac-
countable for the success or failure of their market participation, "163 offers
no protection to residential customers, and effectively leaves the residential
consumer out in the cold. Ironically, the Commission's bypass preference
protected those captive consumers. Now, with the demise of the LDC pref-
erence, consumers have lost the necessary protection they once had.
The court of appeals' analysis of Order No. 436 failed to perceive this
distinction. Specifically, the court's reading of the NGA as a passive over-
sight statute is inconsistent, not only with the NGA's legislative history,'
but also with prior Supreme Court interpretations of the NGA. 165 Further-
more, the court's understanding of the LDC market appears to be concep-
tually flawed. The court asserted that bypass would occur only if the LDC
was operating in an inefficient or discriminatory manner. 66 The court over-
looked the basic problem that, even if the LDC operated in an efficient or
160. Id. (citing Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329,
333 (1951)).
161. Id. Judge Mikva stated: "I believe the Commission, and now this court, too quickly
dismissed these important concerns about intrusion into the states' sphere of authority and too
casually disregarded the needs of the everyday consumer, whose energy bill is likely to increase
dramatically as a result of this ill-considered provision." Id. at 1045-46.
162. This misperception is evidenced by the terms the Commission uses in Order No. 436,
indicating that it will no longer protect LDCs from market forces. Order No. 436, supra note
6, at 42,469.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. Associated Gas Distrib, 824 F.2d at 1035.
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nondiscriminatory manner, a retailer could not effectively compete with its
wholesale supplier for the same customers. Therefore, the only way that an
LDC could "beat" the pipeline would be to sell the gas at a loss or to recover
the costs from existing customers or shareholders. 167 Also, the court over-
looked the fact that the competitive market was a reality for only certain
segments of the natural gas market.
V. RECENT LDC BYPASS CASES
Since issuing Order No. 436, the Commission has approved a number of
requests to bypass LDCs, 168 and recent cases reflect the Commission's cur-
rent passive attitude toward protecting the residential consumer. The cases
also indicate that leaving residential protection in the hands of state utility
commissions is inadequate because state authorities may be preempted, or
otherwise be precluded from adequately responding to the bypass and from
protecting their residential natural gas consumers. Some courts have recog-
nized the harm to consumers from bypass and have suggested that the Com-
mission act to ensure consumer protection.
In Northern Natural Gas Co.,169 the Commission issued Northern Natu-
ral, an interstate pipeline, a certificate of public convenience and necessity to
serve Terra International, Inc. Terra, a fertilizer manufacturer, previously
purchased 100% of its natural gas from Iowa Public Service (IPS), an
LDC.17 ° IPS protested the proposed bypass and raised several arguments
previously recognized by the Commission as grounds for denying a bypass
request. Specifically, IPS argued that the bypass would unfairly impact its
remaining retail customers."7 Moreover, IPS criticized the proposed bypass
because it would require duplication of facilities. IPS also argued that after
167. For example, if the interstate pipeline sells gas at $2.00 per Mcf, for the LDC to
compete it would also have to sell the gas at $2.00 per Mcf. However, the LDC incurs costs in
transporting the gas from the interstate pipeline to its customers and those costs are added to
the $2.00. Therefore, if the LDC competes with the pipeline and sells the gas at $2.00, it
would either sell the gas at a loss or allocate the lost costs to the remaining customers or its
shareholders through a lower dividend.
168. See, e.g., Williams Natural Gas Co., 47 F.E.R.C. $ 61,080 (1989); Northern Natural
Gas Co., 46 F.E.R.C. 61,270; Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 46
F.E.R.C. 61,077; Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 45 F.E.R.C.
61,272 (1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 939 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 40 F.E.R.C.
61,220 (1987), aff'd, Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
American Distribs. Co., 37 F.E.R.C. 61,282 (1986).
169. 46 F.E.R.C. 61,270 (1989).
170. Id at 61,792. IPS served Terra pursuant to a 20 year contract. The contract expired
in June, 1987, and IPS served Terra on a month to month basis thereafter. Id
171. Terra leaving the IPS system meant that IPS would lose $650,000 in annual revenues.
Id at 61,793. Based on this loss, IPS computed that the bypass would result in an increase in
its sales rates to its remaining customers of 1.5 cents per Mcf. Id.
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the bypass Terra might not receive adequate service and, therefore, IPS was
left with the burden of having to stand ready to serve Terra without receiv-
ing any compensation.' 72 Similarly, the Iowa State Utilities Board protested
the bypass, arguing that the Commission's new role in addressing bypass
intrudes into a local matter, and thus the proposal should be left for local
officials to regulate.' 73
Finding that the proposed bypass was required by the public convenience
and necessity, the Commission rejected IPS' and the Board's protests.'
74
The Commission reasoned that, under its new LDC bypass policy, both IPS
and Northern Natural could compete for Terra's business. 7  To the extent
that IPS' remaining customers would be adversely affected by a bypass, the
Commission noted that the State Board could change IPS' rates so that IPS
would internalize the loss or the LDC's shareholders would bear the bur-
den.' 76 However, the Commission refused to address the concerns of resi-
dential customers. Its refusal was based on the principle that, "[i]n a
competitive market environment, the parties are at risk for their own deci-
sions, and the need to provide competitive services is a factor that leads to
improved service at lower cost for consumers. ''177 Moreover, the Commis-
sion asserted that its only obligation under the NGA was to establish "con-
ditions by which the gas arrives in the hands of consumers or LDCs on
terms that conform to the [NGA]."'
17 1
172. Id at 61,792.
173. Id. at 61,794.
174. Id
175. Id
176. The Commission's conclusion that the LDC's shareholders can bear the loss of reve-
nue by decreased dividends, rather than the LDC's customers bear the loss by increased rates,
is only facially persuasive. Specifically, the conclusion does not reconcile with fundamental
ratemaking principles and United States Supreme Court precedent on ratemaking methodolo-
gies. These principles require that a rate set by a commission cannot be so low as to not allow
the utility an opportunity to earn a reasonable return on its capital investment. See, e.g., Du-
quesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989). A rate set below a reasonable return level
would constitute an illegal taking under the Constitution. Id. at 616. Moreover, because the
state utility commission desires the LDC within its jurisdiction to remain in operation to pro-
vide public service, it sets rates which allow an opportunity to collect an adequate return on
investment so that the LDC can solicit adequate funds from investors. See J. ToMAIN, supra
note 27, at 165. If investors realized that with each bypass of the LDC they would suffer a
decreased chance of a return on their stock in the company, they would unlikely remain inves-
tors, or become investors, in LDCs.
177. Northern Natural Gas Co., 46 F.E.R.C. at 61,270 (quoting American Gas Distribs.,
37 F.E.R.C. 61,282, at 61,854-855 (1986)).
178. Id. at 61,794 (quoting Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1036 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1987)).
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On rehearing of the initial order, 79 the Commission elaborated on its new
view toward LDC bypass. The Commission acknowledged its prior "quali-
fied preference" for LDCs over pipelines to serve industrial endusers. "° The
Commission maintained, however, that any preference should only be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis to appropriately protect the competing interests
of the LDC and the industrial enduser."'8 Under its current policy "to en-
courage access between willing buyers and sellers of natural gas in an atmos-
phere of fair competition,"' 2 the Commission requires the LDC to compete
with the interstate pipeline or lose business.18 3 The Commission concluded
that the benefits of competition outweigh its detriments and inure to all mar-
ket participants, even those remaining on the LDC after bypass.'8 4
The state utility commission and the LDC argued that the Commission's
suggestions to change the state-determined retail rates to protect consumers
against bypass intruded on state policy prerogatives. 185 For example, the
Commission suggested that the state utility commission could require LDCs
to provide "open access" to their industrial customers to enable customers to
arrange their own supplies and simply use LDCs to transport the gas.
18 6
The Commission also suggested that the state commission could establish
maximum and minimum rates, reallocate fixed costs between industrial cus-
tomers and residential consumers, and require stockholders of LDCs to bear
some of the shifted costs.' 87 Because intrastate rate matters are within the
jurisdiction of state commissions, the Commission has no authority to re-
quire state commissions to implement such changes. Therefore, the recom-
mendations did little for post-bypass customers.
Even where state commissions have acted to protect their consumers from
an LDC bypass, courts have rejected the attempts because the Commission's
179. 48 F.E.R.C. 61,232 (1989). Section 19 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1988), allows
any party "aggrieved" by a Commission order to ask the Commission to rehear an order. On
rehearing, the Commission has the authority to modify or abrogate its prior order. Id. Regu-
lated companies frequently use the Commission's rehearing procedure.
180. Northern Natural Gas Co., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,232, at 61,827 (citing Panhandle E. Pipe
Line Co., 36 F.P.C. 1107, 1109 (1966), modifiedon reh'g, 37 F.P.C. 314, 315 (1967); Southern
Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 925, 927 (1961); American La. Pipe Line Co., 20 F.P.C. 575, 592
(1958)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 61,828; see also Williams Natural Gas Co., 47 F.E.R.C. 61,080 at 61,225-226
(1989).
183. Northern Natural Gas Co., 48 F.E.R.C. at 61,829.
184. Id. The Commission did indicate, however, that it would limit LDC bypass if
achieved through unfair competition. Id.
185. Id. at 61,826.
186. Id. at 61,829.
187. Id. But see supra note 176 (shifting costs to shareholders may violate ratemaking
principles and deter private investment in public utilities).
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decision to allow the bypass preempts subsequent state efforts to control the
transaction. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that intra-
state transportation and rate matters are within the control of the state com-
missions," s s parties desiring bypass can easily avoid state regulation by
structuring their natural gas transaction as interstate commerce. In Panhan-
de Eastern Pipe Line Co., ' 9 the Commission permitted Panhandle Eastern
to bypass LDC Michigan Consolidated Gas Company to serve National
Steel directly. The Commission again relied on the virtues of competition as
the basis for allowing the pipeline, and industrial customer, to bypass the
LDC. 190
While the Commission allowed the bypass, the Michigan Public Service
Commission (Michigan PSC) also attempted to exert jurisdiction over the
proposed bypass. Pursuant to Michigan law, the Michigan PSC has author-
ity over gas sales and over the facilities that are used to sell the gas in the
state of Michigan. 9 ' In National Steel Corp. v. Long, '9 2 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that the Michigan
PSC could not exert jurisdiction over the bypass because the transaction was
interstate commerce and was exclusively under the federal Commission's ju-
risdiction. 193 After recognizing that a state maintains jurisdiction over the
retail sale of natural gas to consumers within its borders,'9 4 the court held
that, because National Steel purchased the gas in Oklahoma rather than in
Michigan, the gas delivered in Michigan was only delivered as the tail end of
interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Michigan
PSC did not have jurisdiction over the transaction and that the Michigan
188. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 333-334
(1951).
189. 40 F.E.R.C. 61,220 (1987), aff'd, Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F.2d 117
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1807 (1990).
190. Id. at 61,751. The Commission held:
"In a competitive market environment, the parties are at a risk for their own deci-
sions, and the need to provide competitive services is the factor that leads to im-
proved service at lower cost for consumers.... Under these circumstances, and in
the absence of any suggestion of unfair competition, we believe that the public inter-
est is best served by our sustaining the result of that competition."
Id. (quoting American Distribs. Co. 37 F.E.R.C. 61,282 (1986)).
191. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 460.502 (1990) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.142 (Callaghan
1989)).
192. 689 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 887 F.2d 1295 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1806
(1990).
193. Id. at 738.
194. Id. at 732; see also 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
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PSC was precluded from implementing consumer protection plans.'9 5 Still,
after holding that the state utility commission was preempted from regulat-
ing the bypass, the court raised the interest of residential consumers. The
court acknowledged that, because the federal Commission occupied the field
and the state commission was limited in what it could do to address consum-
ers' concerns, the federal Commission should act to protect the residential
consumers' interests.1
96
Likewise, in Kansas Power and Light Co. v. FERC, 197 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a Commission
order approving a bypass, but directed the Commission to address claims
that its bypass policy thwarted state efforts to allocate to industrial custom-
ers those costs incurred while serving residential consumers. In Kansas
Power and Light, the Commission permitted Williams Natural Gas Com-
pany to bypass Kansas Power and Light Company to serve an industrial
customer pursuant to a section 7 blanket certificate.' 98 In upholding the
Commission's LDC bypass policy, the court acknowledged that the Com-
mission relied on competition as the best manner to serve the public inter-
est.199 Further, the court noted that the Commission had moved "from a tilt
against bypass to a tilt in its favor."" ° Despite this change in Commission
policy, however, the court recognized that the Commission's bypass policy
must be consistent with its statutory grant under section 7 of the NGA and
that the Commission must control market entry when necessary,2"' that is,
when it is not in the public convenience and necessity. Accordingly, the
court stated that "if parties oppose bypass on the ground that it thwarts state
efforts to subsidize residential customers with economic rents secured from
businesses, the Commission will have to address such claims.
20 2
195. National Steel, 689 F. Supp. at 733. In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 906
F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court questioned the Commission's broad reading of the NGA
to determine that a bypass is in interstate commerce. In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., Williams
Natural Gas sought to bypass Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., an LDC, by transporting the gas
from one point in Oklahoma to another point in Oklahoma. Because the NGA regulates
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, the LDC argued that the transportation
was outside of the Commission's jurisdiction. Id. at 710. The court agreed and remanded the
decision back to the Commission for it to further explain its finding that the transportation was
in interstate commerce. Id. at 713.
196. National Steel, 689 F. Supp. at 738.
197. 891 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
198. Williams Natural Gas Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 1 61,272 (1988), reh'g, 46 F.E.R.C. 61,216
(1989).
199. Kansas Power & Light, 891 F.2d at 941.
200. Id. at 942.
201. Id. at 943.
202. Id.
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VI. LDC BYPASS: ARE RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS BEING
LEFr IN THE COLD?
A. Critique of the Commission's Bypass Policy
The Commission's deregulation orders aim to fulfill NGA requirements
through market competition rather than governmental intervention. 20 3 In
easing its regulatory controls over the industry, and thereby allowing the
"invisible hand" of competition to direct the market, the Commission has
permitted and encouraged segments of the industry previously shielded from
competition to compete directly. 2" While previously adhering to the posi-
tion that certain elements of the industry such as interstate pipelines and
LDCs should not compete directly because such competition would result in
increased costs and higher rates to consumers,2"5 the Commission, in the
deregulation era, now promotes competition as the method for controlling
service and rates. 2° Central to the Commission's argument is the principle
that, in the current market, all market participants can compete and, there-
fore, should be held responsible for their actions in the competitive
marketplace.2 °7
Unfortunately, the Commission has consistently failed to recognize, or
even acknowledge, that competition in the "deregulated" market is not
available for certain consumers in the gas industry. Residential consumers,
those who are limited to purchasing their gas from the LDC to heat their
homes and to cook their meals, cannot realistically take advantage of the
competitive market. 208 They cannot shop around for the most competitively
priced natural gas. Instead, because of the significant investment involved in
purchasing and distributing natural gas, they will remain obligated to
purchase gas from their LDC.209 The typical residential consumer cannot
afford to construct a direct hookup with the interstate pipeline. Further, the
residential consumer neither demands the volume of natural gas required to
make a hookup economically feasible nor possesses the business expertise to
negotiate for natural gas supplies.210
Therefore, the competition created by the Commission at the interstate
level does not, and realistically cannot, operate on the residential consumer
level. Ironically, the NGA requires the Commission to protect the con-
203. See supra note 6.
204. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,469.
205. See supra notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
206. Order No. 436, supra note 6, at 42,413.
207. Id. at 42,469.
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sumer, particularly the residential consumer, from unreasonable rates and
unfair market pressures and the old LDC bypass policy did just that.2 1'
Under the new bypass policy, however, the Commission fails to protect resi-
dential consumers. Rather, the Commission appears to be protecting com-
petition for competition's sake, even though it is the consumer, and not
competition, that the NGA requires the Commission to protect. While the
Commission's policy to increase competition may be a good one for those
who can compete, many cannot. As long as its statutory mandate to protect
consumers exists, the Commission must comply with that mandate.21 2
B. Recommendation: A More Active Role for State Commissions
The Commission's bypass policy has left residential customers without ad-
equate market protection. Residential customers in the 1990's are facing the
same dilemma that customers faced before Congress passed the NGA.
Before passage of the NGA, the lack of competition harmed residential con-
sumers and state utility commissions were preempted from taking an active
role in regulating the transactions. 21  Today, while some elements of the
market do enjoy increased competitive alternatives, residential consumers do
not. Just as the unfair impacts on consumers in the 1930's required federal
legislation, federal legislation may be necessary to provide consumers with,
protection in the 1990's. While the Commission suggests that state utility
commissions already have the authority to prevent LDC bypass, or at least
to mollify its adverse effects on residential consumers, case law has shown
that the state utility commissions are limited in what they can do.2" 4
State utility commissions are currently ill-equipped to protect the residen-
tial consumers who are adversely affected by LDC bypass. Because Con-
gress directed the Commission to protect consumers in accordance with the
suggestions of National Steel and Kansas Power and Light, the Commission
should consider and evaluate concerns raised by residential consumers
rather than passively rely on competitive forces to do the job. Particularly,
because LDC bypass transactions can be structured to avoid state utility
commission jurisdiction, the federal Commission should act to protect con-
sumer interests in those cases. Given the determination of the Commission
in pressing its new LDC bypass policy,215 however, it is unlikely that the
Commission will follow the urging of National Steel and Kansas Power and
Light. If the Commission continues to refuse to reevaluate its LDC bypass
211. See supra notes 4-5.
212. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 56-73.
214. See supra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
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policy, state utility commissions should be permitted to exert some control
over LDC bypass. One method to ensure protection for residential consum-
ers is for Congress to enact legislation that provides state utility commissions
with the authority to address LDC bypass while maintaining its full panoply
of state regulatory prerogatives.216
Because LDC bypass may have positive effects, the state utility commis-
sions should not be allowed to automatically bar LDC bypass. Rather, state
utility commissions should be permitted to review bypass proposals and to
determine whether the bypass is in the best interest for all of its consumers,
residential and industrial alike.2 17 While state utility commissions have al-
lowed LDC rates to favor the residential consumer over the industrial cus-
tomer, allowing states to regulate bypass will not necessarily jeopardize
industrial competitive rates for industrial customers. The state utility com-
missions are closer to the local distribution market. Thus, they are better
equipped to achieve a balanced and efficient trade off between the industrial
and residential consumer.218 Further, industrial customers could exert
political pressure on the state commissions to urge balanced and efficient
LDC rates. For example, evidence that an industrial customer may shut
down or lay off employees because of expensive fuel costs could prompt the
state commission to reduce the LDC's rates or allow the bypass. The impor-
tant aspect of this alternative, and the aspect that is missing from the Com-
mission's analysis of bypass cases, is that if the state commissions were
permitted to act, the interests of the residential consumer would be
considered.
216. Pending before the United States House of Representatives at the end of the 101st
Congress was H.R. 540, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), entitled the "Natural Gas Transition
Act of 1989." The bill prevented the Commission from authorizing a bypass if a local or state
utility commission certified that "the service would prejudice the present or future interests of
the customers of the affected local distribution company," or if an affected LDC protests the
bypass and the parties attempting the bypass cannot show that the LDC is unwilling to pro-
vide the service. In the 102nd Congress, natural gas legislation may remain a high legislative
priority, and the bill may be reintroduced.
217. Some states have adopted such measures. See D. MUCHOW & W. MOGEL, ENERGY
LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 57.04(5) (1990). For example, some states have allowed LDCs to
condition the ability of industrial customers to return to the LDC system after they bypassed
the LDC. These measures do not prevent LDC bypass and only provide relief when the cus-
tomer returns, if at all. Some states have enacted statutes to reject bypass proposals. Id (cit-
ing IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-87.5 (Burns 1986 Supp.)). Because the NGA may preempt state
statutes regulating LDC bypass, such statutes may also offer little protection against LDC
bypass. Finally, some states have followed the Commission's suggestions and revised their
LDC rates to more evenly allocate costs between residential and industrial customers. Id
218. See Note, Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal Energy Statutes, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1315-16 (1990) (arguing that under a preemption analysis, courts should
permit the most efficient regulator to regulate the transaction).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Congress decided to ensure consumer protection in the interstate natural
gas market by enacting the NGA. For years, the Commission considered
residential consumer interests when reviewing LDC bypass cases. In the
deregulated market, the Commission has changed its policy from protecting
the consumer to protecting competition. As a result of the Commission's
change in policy, segments of the industry that cannot compete, particularly
residential customers, suffer the adverse affects of competition. Despite the
congressional mandate of the NGA, the Commission is no longer actively
protecting this group.
Because federal protection of these captive consumers no longer exists, the
regulatory void should be filled by state regulatory agencies. The options
offered by the Commission to the captive customers are neither viable nor
responsive to the problem. Therefore, state utility commissions should be
allowed to step into the "bypass arena" to ensure that captive customers
enjoy the regulatory protection they continue to need.
Martin V. Kirkwood
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